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7 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
8 **SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**  
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10 ACE BUSINESS SOLUTIONS, LLC,  
11 Plaintiff,  
12 vs.  
13 GLOBAL MARKETING &  
14 DEVELOPMENT, INC., and  
15 AWESOME ENTERPRISES, LLC,  
16 Defendants.  
17

Case No. 15cv1464-MMA (NLS)

**ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO  
INTERVENE**

[Doc. No. 52]

18 Third parties TDL Global Ventures (“TDL”) and Losany Enterprises, LLC  
19 (“Losany”) (collectively, “the Intervenor”) move to intervene in this action pursuant to  
20 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. *See* Doc. No. 52. The Court found this matter  
21 suitable for determination on the papers and without oral argument pursuant to Civil  
22 Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below, the Court **GRANTS** the  
23 Intervenor’s motion to intervene.

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1 **BACKGROUND**

2 On July 2, 2015, Plaintiff Ace Business Solutions, LLC (“Plaintiff” or “Ace”) filed  
3 this interpleader action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335. *See* Doc. No. 1. Plaintiff requests  
4 the Court determine, as between Defendants Global Marketing & Development, Inc.  
5 (“GMD”) and Awesome Enterprises, LLC (“Awesome”), the rights to a particular sum of  
6 money (“Net Distribution”) that Plaintiff has collected. Plaintiff Ace is a debt processing  
7 company that provides processing services for GMD pursuant to an agreement between  
8 the two entities. *See* Doc. Nos. 1, 24. Ace, as part of its services, collects payments from  
9 consumers and pays portions of those funds to GMD. Plaintiff also used to provide  
10 processing services to a company called 5STAR, Inc. (“5STAR”), which was originally  
11 owned by Awesome. *See* Doc. Nos. 1, 21. At some point,<sup>1</sup> GMD acquired 5STAR and  
12 thereby acquired 5STAR’s servicing obligations. *See* Doc. Nos. 1, 21. Awesome  
13 disputes the propriety of this transaction and as a result, Awesome and GMD allegedly  
14 began to give Ace conflicting instructions regarding to whom Ace should distribute  
15 collected funds.

16 Specifically, on June 17, 2015, Ace alleges it received notice from attorneys who  
17 represent organizations<sup>2</sup> that were previously affiliated with 5STAR, and who asserted  
18 there were certain “improprieties related to the transfer of ownership of 5STAR to GMD  
19 and/or parties affiliated with GMD,” which affected GMD’s entitlement to funds that Ace  
20 would typically transfer to GMD. On June 26, 2015, Plaintiff received notice from GMD  
21 requesting Plaintiff transfer to it the entire Net Distribution. Awesome claims a portion  
22 of the Net Distribution, and asserts GMD is entitled to none of it because GMD  
23 committed fraud and “misappropriate[d] companies and assets belonging to Awesome  
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26 <sup>1</sup> The particular facts surrounding 5STAR’s relationship to Awesome are unclear, but it appears that at  
27 this time, Awesome was still affiliated with 5STAR.

<sup>2</sup> The Complaint indicates that Awesome was one of these organizations. *See* Doc. No. 1, ¶ 20.

1 and businesses related to Awesome, [and] the revenue from debt invalidations businesses  
2 belonging to businesses related to Awesome.” *See* Doc. No. 26.

3 Also, both GMD and Ace have filed counterclaims against one another arising out  
4 of the agreement between them. *See* Doc. Nos. 9, 16. GMD has filed a counterclaim  
5 against Ace alleging breach of contract and conversion. Ace has filed a counterclaim  
6 against GMD asserting claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good  
7 faith and fair dealing.

8 On January 1, 2016, the Intervenor filed a motion to intervene in this action.<sup>3</sup> *See*  
9 Doc. No. 21. This Court denied the Intervenor’s initial motion on April 14, 2016. *See*  
10 Doc. No. 30. The Intervenor had “made certain claims against GMD” in the District  
11 Court of Maryland concerning both the Intervenor’s “rights to some of the interplead  
12 monies to which GMD claimed to be entitled” as well as a breach of contract claim. *See*  
13 Doc. No. 52, p. 5; *see also* Doc. No. 55, p. 7. When the Intervenor filed the first motion  
14 to intervene, the Maryland action was still pending. *See* Doc. No. 52, p. 5. Both Ace and  
15 GMD opposed the Intervenor’s first motion to intervene. *See* Doc. Nos. 24, 25.

16 Before the Intervenor brought this second motion to intervene, the District Court  
17 of Maryland entered a final judgment in favor of the Intervenor against GMD for  
18 \$1,500,000.00. *See* Doc. No. 52, p. 5. Furthermore, the District Court in Maryland  
19 issued a Writ of Execution to the Intervenor “as to the monies to which GMD is  
20 entitled” in this case. *See id.* Purportedly based on the outcome of the Maryland case,  
21 GMD assigned to the Intervenor “jointly, all rights and entitlements to . . . [a]ny monies  
22 that presently are or will be due to GMD from the interplead monies in [the instant  
23 action].” *See* Doc. No. 55, Lubar Decl., Exh. 2. GMD joined in the Intervenor’s second  
24 motion to intervene and claimed it “does not intend to spend any significant money and  
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27 <sup>3</sup> The Court **DENIES AS MOOT** Plaintiff’s request that the Court take judicial notice of this filing. The Court need not take  
judicial notice of filings in the instant case.

1 time defending the [interpleader action] and expects Intervenor to assert all rights to  
2 which GMD would have been entitled.” See Doc. No. 52-4.

3 **LEGAL STANDARD**

4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 governs motions to intervene in federal court.  
5 Rule 24 states that a court must, upon a timely motion, allow intervention of right where  
6 the movant:

7  
8 (1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal  
9 statute; or (2) claims an interest relating to the property or  
10 transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated  
11 that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or  
12 impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless  
13 existing parties adequately represent that interest.

14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). The Ninth Circuit has interpreted Rule 24(a) as requiring an  
15 applicant meet all of the following four factors:

16 (1) the application for intervention must be timely;<sup>4</sup> (2) the  
17 applicant must have a ‘significant protectable’ interest relating  
18 to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action;  
19 (3) the applicant must be so situated that the disposition of the  
20 action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the  
21 applicant’s ability to protect that interest; and (4) the applicant’s  
22 interest must not be adequately represented by the existing  
23 parties in the lawsuit.

24 *Arakaki v. Cayetano*, 324 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2003), as amended (May 13, 2003);  
25 *Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. Berg*, 268 F.3d 810, 817–18 (9th Cir. 2001);  
26 *C.S. ex rel. Struble v. California Dep’t of Educ.*, No. 08-CV-0226-W(AJB), 2008 WL  
27 962159, at \*2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2008). An applicant has a significant protectable interest

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<sup>4</sup> The parties do not dispute the timeliness of the Intervenor’s motion.

1 where its interest is protected under some law, and there is a relationship between its  
2 legally protected interest and the plaintiff's claims. *See Donnelly v. Glickman*, 159 F.3d  
3 405, 409 (9th Cir. 1998). The resolution of the plaintiff's claims must actually affect the  
4 applicant, but if there would be a substantial effect, the applicant "should, as a general  
5 rule, be entitled to intervene." *Id.*; *Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. Berg*, 268  
6 F.3d 810, 822 (9th Cir. 2001).

7 In the alternative, courts may allow permissive intervention under Rule 24(b). The  
8 court may allow anyone to permissively intervene who:

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10 (A) is given a conditional right to intervene by a federal statute;  
11 or (B) has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a  
12 common question of law or fact. [. . .] (3) Delay or Prejudice. In  
13 exercising its discretion, the court must consider whether the  
14 intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of  
15 the original parties' rights.

16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). Further, a party seeking to permissively intervene must establish  
17 that their motion was timely and that the court has an independent jurisdictional basis for  
18 the party's claims. *See C.S. ex rel. Struble*, 2008 WL 962159 at \*2.

## 19 **DISCUSSION**

### 20 **A. TDL's and Losany's Grounds for Intervention**

21 The Intervenor's contend they may intervene as a matter of right, or in the  
22 alternative, are entitled to permissive intervention in this interpleader action based on the  
23 Writ of Execution and the assignment. *See* Doc. No. 52. The Intervenor's contend their  
24 interests are significantly different now as compared with when they filed their first  
25 motion to intervene. *See* Doc. No. 52. Notably, the Intervenor's argue that the Court  
26 denied their first motion to intervene because of the Court's concern that the Intervenor's  
27 had a speculative interest in the current action. Now, the Intervenor's argue, based on the

1 Writ of Execution and GMD's assignment, they have a concrete "interest relating to the  
2 property or transaction that is the subject of the action" and one which GMD will not  
3 adequately protect. *See* Doc. No. 52. Because "GMD is no longer entitled to recover  
4 any" of the interplead monies, the Intervenor's assert they are no longer "potential  
5 judgment creditors" but rather, "real-parties-in-interest." *See* Doc. No. 52.

6 Moreover, the Intervenor's argue GMD currently has little incentive to litigate their  
7 rights to interplead funds because GMD assigned their rights in this action to the  
8 Intervenor's. *See* Doc. No. 52, p. 8. The Intervenor's state that GMD has conducted  
9 "nearly no discovery" relevant to pursuing interplead monies. *See id.*

10 Because the rights under the GMD/Awesome contract are the subject of Plaintiff's  
11 Complaint, the Intervenor's "do[] not seek to expand the scope of issues in the case." *See*  
12 Doc. No. 52. The Intervenor's contend the assignment "simply allow[s] [them] to protect  
13 their interest in the exact same claims to the interplead monies that GMD would have had  
14 . . . ." *See id.* In other words, the Intervenor's state they are not seeking to litigate any  
15 additional contractual rights and therefore intervention is narrowly confined to the  
16 contract at issue in Plaintiff's Complaint. *See id.* at 10.

#### 17 **B. Plaintiff Ace's Arguments in Opposition**

18 Plaintiff contends that the Intervenor's are no more than judgment creditors seeking  
19 to collect on a judgment, which does not entitle them to intervention as a matter of right  
20 or permissive intervention. *See* Doc. No. 55, p. 5. Further, Plaintiff argues that the  
21 Intervenor's are not assignees of the GMD contract, but rather, have only been assigned  
22 the right to funds under the contract. Plaintiff argues this reinforces the idea that the  
23 Intervenor's are merely judgment creditors.

24 Also, Plaintiff asserts GMD still has incentive to litigate because GMD has to  
25 defend against Plaintiff's counterclaims. Plaintiff argues "the Amount of the ACE  
26 counterclaims exceed the amount of the funds interplead and the damages alleged by  
27 GMD in its claims against ACE." *See* Doc. No. 55. Accordingly, Plaintiff contends

1 GMD “will protect its share in the proverbial pie.” *See* Doc. No. 55. Plaintiff also argues  
2 that GMD has not provided the Court with any evidence that it will not defend the  
3 counterclaims because GMD’s notice of joinder does not have evidentiary value as it is  
4 not a declaration made under penalty of perjury.

5 Lastly, Plaintiff contends intervention would be prejudicial because it would  
6 “explode this simple case involving one contract and three entities, into a multi-party,  
7 multi-claim, multi-contract litigation seeking the resolution of claims, contracts and  
8 issues” which Plaintiff is not involved in. *See* Doc. No. 55. Plaintiff further contends  
9 they will be prejudiced by allowing intervention because the scope of discovery will be  
10 expanded into numerous irrelevant issues in this case such as the legitimacy of the  
11 Intervenor’s assignment. *See* Doc. No. 55.

## 12 **C. Analysis**

### 13 **i. Timeliness of Plaintiff’s Opposition**

14 As an initial matter, the Intervenor’s argue Plaintiff’s opposition brief was untimely.  
15 The Intervenor’s contend that the brief was due on January 13, 2017 because pursuant to  
16 the briefing schedule governed by the Civil Local Rules, the deadline would otherwise  
17 fall on January 16, 2017—the Birthday of Martin Luther King, Jr., a federal holiday. *See*  
18 5 U.S.C. § 6103. Plaintiff did not file the opposition until January 17, 2017. However,  
19 the Civil Local Rules do not provide for the situation in which the deadline for filing an  
20 opposition brief falls on a holiday. *See* Civ. L. R. 7.1(e)(2). Thus, Federal Rule of Civil  
21 Procedure 6(a) governs, meaning that Plaintiff’s opposition brief was timely filed on  
22 January 17, 2017. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) (stating that if the deadline lands on a holiday,  
23 “the period continues to run until the end of the next day that is not a . . . legal holiday.”).

### 24 **ii. Intervention of Right**

25 The Intervenor’s have not pointed the Court to any federal statute that mandates  
26 their intervention. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1). Thus, to intervene as of right, the  
27 Intervenor’s must show they have a significant protectable interest related to the property

1 or transaction underlying the litigation, and are “so situated that disposing of the action  
2 may as a practical matter impair or impede [their] ability to protect [their] interest, unless  
3 existing parties adequately represent [those] interest[s].” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).

4       Regarding the present motion, the Court is persuaded that the Intervenor’s interests  
5 are so situated. Specifically, the “Assignment of Claims and Rights” demonstrates a  
6 property right to the underlying claims in this action. The Court’s task in evaluating the  
7 scope of an assignment is to “enforce the intent of the parties.” *See Klamath–Lake*  
8 *Pharm. Ass’n v. Klamath Med. Serv. Bureau*, 701 F.2d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 1983); *see*  
9 *also In re WellPoint, Inc. Out-of-Network UCR Rates Litig.*, 903 F. Supp. 2d 880, 896  
10 (C.D. Cal. 2012). In joining the Intervenor’s second motion, GMD demonstrates its  
11 intent that Intervenor protect their own interests in this action by stating that GMD “does  
12 not intend to spend any significant money and time defending the underlying complaint  
13 and expects Intervenor to assert all rights to which GMD would have been entitled.” *See*  
14 *Doc. No. 52-4*. Thus, the Intervenor’s interests in this action have morphed from  
15 speculative and theoretical into concrete and certain.

16       To have a significant protectable interest, a movant’s interest must itself be  
17 affected by the resolution of the litigation. Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks a determination as  
18 to what GMD is entitled to from the interplead monies, and the “Assignment of Rights  
19 and Claims” divests GMD’s interests in asserting these claims to the Intervenor. It  
20 therefore appears the Intervenor are not “one [] step removed” from the litigation’s  
21 resolution because the Intervenor seek adjudication of some of the same issues as  
22 Plaintiff does. *See U.S. v. Ballantyne*, No. 13-CV-53-BTM, 2013 WL 4716234, at \*3  
23 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2013). Thus, “there is a relationship between [rights created outside  
24 the scope of this litigation] and the claims at issue” here. *See Donnelly*, 159 F.3d at 409;  
25 *Arakaki v. Cayetano*, 324 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2003), *as amended* (May 13, 2003).

26       Accordingly, the general rule that judgment creditors do not have legally  
27 protectable interests in litigation involving the debtors does not apply here. *See U.S. v.*



1 *Alisal Water Corp.*, 370 F.3d 915, 920 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding an “interest in the  
2 prospective collectability of [a] debt [. . .] [was] not sufficiently related” to the action  
3 because the interest was “several degrees removed” from the policies at issue). For the  
4 above reasons, the Intervenor’s interests in this case are distinguishable from the  
5 contingent creditor’s interests in *Alisal* based on the assignment and Writ of Execution  
6 entitling the Intervenor “to the monies to which GMD is entitled in this litigation.” *See*  
7 Doc. No. 52, p. 5.

8       Lastly, the Court is unpersuaded that the Intervenor’s interests are adequately  
9 protected by Defendants’ interest in defending Plaintiff’s counterclaims. *See* Doc. No.  
10 55, p. 10. Regardless of the “evidentiary value”<sup>5</sup> of GMD’s notice of joinder, GMD has  
11 indicated to the Court that it “does not intend to spend any significant money and time  
12 defending the underlying complaint and expects Intervenor to assert all rights to which  
13 GMD would have been entitled.” Doc. No. 52-4. Further, based on common sense,  
14 GMD has little incentive to litigate issues relating to the underlying Complaint when it  
15 has assigned all of its rights to any interplead funds to the Intervenor. Plaintiff’s  
16 suggestion that GMD has an interest in defending the counterclaim because any money  
17 GMD is awarded in this action “will be offset by the counterclaim damages awarded to  
18 ACE” is similarly unpersuasive. *See* Doc. No. 55. Whether GMD has an interest in  
19 defending the counterclaim is distinguishable from whether GMD has an interest in  
20 defending the underlying Complaint, which the Intervenor are most concerned about.

21       For the foregoing reasons, the Intervenor have significant protectable interests that  
22 are at risk of being impaired or impeded by the resolution of this action, and which are  
23 not currently adequately protected. Therefore, the Intervenor are entitled to intervene as  
24 a matter of right in this action.

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26 <sup>5</sup> On that note, the Court **OVERRULES** all of Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections to the Intervenor’s  
27 evidence as moot. The Court need only consider undisputed facts and the parties’ arguments in deciding  
this motion.

1                   **iii. Permissive Intervention**

2           Even were the Court to find the Intervenor do not have the right to intervene  
3 pursuant to Rule 24(a), the Court has discretion to allow them to intervene pursuant to  
4 Rule 24(b). As an initial matter, the Intervenor do not claim to have a conditional right  
5 to intervene under a federal statute. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). Accordingly, the  
6 Intervenor must show they have a claim or defense that shares a common question of  
7 law or fact with this action. *Id.* Also, the Court is required to determine whether  
8 intervention would unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the current parties'  
9 rights. *Id.*

10           As the Court previously stated, GMD assigned the Intervenor its rights to the  
11 funds disputed in this action. Therefore, the rights the Intervenor seek to protect by  
12 intervening in this action directly relate to the issues raised by Plaintiff's Complaint.  
13 Based on the assignment, the Intervenor do not seek to litigate additional contractual  
14 rights that are not already at issue in the current litigation. Thus, both the Intervenor and  
15 Plaintiff have shared questions of law or fact—namely, both have an interest in  
16 determining GMD's rights to the funds in this interpleader action.

17           For those same reasons, the Court is unpersuaded that the Intervenor's intervention  
18 would "explode" this case into numerous unrelated and new claims, as Plaintiff argues.  
19 *See* Doc. No. 55, p. 6; *see Buffin v. City & Cty. of San Francisco*, No. 15-CV-04959-  
20 YGR, 2017 WL 889543, at \*4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2017) (allowing intervenors whose  
21 interests resembled a judgment creditor's to permissively intervene based partially on the  
22 intervention's narrow scope). Further, the Intervenor assure the Court that any  
23 discovery they would wish to take should the Court grant this motion would be minimal.  
24 Thus, the Court does not find intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication  
25 of the original parties' rights.


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1 CONCLUSION

2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court **GRANTS** the Intervenor's' motion to  
3 intervene. Doc. No. 52. **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

4  
5 Dated: April 27, 2017

6   
7 Hon. Michael M. Anello  
8 United States District Judge  
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